O objetivo do artigo é apresentar como Simondon concebe o objeto técnico, a mediação e o ensino refletido da técnica. Num primeiro momento será apresentada a defesa dos objetos técnicos frente a acusação de restrição da experiência humana, da cultura. Num segundo, será apresentada a genealogia do objeto técnico, compreendido enquanto mediação entre o homem e a natureza, para então abordar o tema do ensino refletido da técnica.

This article proposes an object properties approach to object perception. By thinking about objects as clusters of co-instantiated features that possess certain canonical higher-order object properties we can steer a middle way between two extreme views that are dominant in different areas of empirical research into object perception and the development of the object concept. Object perception should be understood in terms of perceptual sensitivity to those object properties, where that perceptual sensitivity can be explained in a manner consistent with (...) the graded representation approach adopted by some connectionist modellers. The object properties approach does justice to the differences between a perceptual system solving the binding problem, on the one hand, and genuinely perceiving objects, on the other, without running into the theoretical problems associated with treating young infants as 'little scientists'. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to present and defend an empiricist, neo-Hempelian account of scientific explanation as ampliative, specialized embedding. The proposal aims to preserve what I take to be the core of Hempel’s empiricist account, by weakening it in some respects and strengthening it in others, introducing two new conditions that solve most of Hempel’s problems without abandoning his empiricist strictures. According to this proposal, to explain a phenomenon is to make it expectable by introducing new conceptual/ontological machinery (...) and using special, and non-ad hoc, non-accidental regularities. The new conditions are elaborated making essential use of two central structuralist ideas, namely T-theoreticity and specialization. I first introduce and qualify the project, then present the new account in detail and assess it vis-à-vis its rivals, and finally discuss some possible objections, concluding that the account fares better than its monistic rivals and well enough to qualify as a promising neo-Hempelian account. Even for those unpersuaded by its monistic goals, it has the merit of calling attention to two new necessary conditions not explicitly emphasized thus far and showing how they serve to answer many of the criticisms addressed against Hempel’s account. (shrink)

What is the relation between philosophical theorizing and experimental data? A modest set of naturalistic assumptions leads to what I term the force-field puzzle. The assumption that philosophy is continuous with natural science, as captured in Quine’s force-field metaphor, seems to push us simultaneously towards thinking that there have to be conceptual constraints upon how we interpret experimental data and towards thinking that there cannot be such conceptual constraints, because all theorizing must be accountable to data and observation. The key (...) to resolving the force-field puzzle is to take a more nuanced view of how conceptual constraints can be accountable to data and observation. This can be done by developing conceptual arguments in conjunction with interpretative frameworks for making sense of experimental evidence. This paper shows how attending to important differences between different types of mindreading yields tools for interpreting experimental and observational data in a manner consistent with a (conceptually derived) constraint that I have developed elsewhere. This is the first-order constraint that second-order thinking, or thinking about thinking, is only available to language-using creatures. (shrink)

Algunos autores han intentado considerar los delirios como certezas –entendidas en el sentido de Wittgenstein– debido a las similitudes que parecen existir entre sus respectivos estatus epistemológicos. Sin embargo, dicho intento ha sido criticado con agudeza, entre otras razones, porque el contenido de los delirios choca frontalmente con el contenido de las certezas, por lo que los delirios no pueden ser comprendidos debido a los cambios en las relaciones de significado. Pero es evidente que, aunque los delirios no se puedan (...) contemplar como certezas, muchos delirios afectan de un modo u otro al sistema de certezas del paciente. Partiendo de esta base, no es descabellado pensar que dicha influencia pudiera ser también recíproca: en otras palabras, parece sumamente recomendable analizar si algunos delirios se podrían contemplar como el resultado de variaciones en certezas. En este artículo llevo a cabo dicho análisis al intentar mostrar que el origen de algunos delirios pedestres y severos puede ser hallado en lo que llamaré “ceguera a posibilidades” e “incertidumbre”, términos que he desarrollado teniendo en cuenta la obra del filósofo Ludwig Wittgenstein. (shrink)

Regulatory science, which generates knowledge relevant for regulatory decision?making, is different from standard academic science in that it is oriented mainly towards the attainment of non?epistemic (practical) aims. The role of uncertainty and the limits to the relevance of academic science are being recognized more and more explicitly in regulatory decision?making. This has led to the introduction of regulation?specific scientific methodologies in order to generate decision?relevant data. However, recent practical experience with such non?standard methodologies indicates that they, too, may be (...) subject to important limitations. We argue that the attainment of non?epistemic values and aims (like the protection of human health and the environment) requires not only control of the quality of the data and the methodologies, but also the selection of the level of regulation deemed adequate in each specific case (including a decision about which of the two, under?regulation or over?regulation, would be more acceptable). (shrink)

Marko Jurjako’s article “Self-deception and the selectivity problem” (Jurjako 2013) offers a very interesting discussion of intentionalist approaches to self-deception and in particular the selectivity objection to anti-intentionalism raised in Bermúdez 1997 and 2000. This note responds to Jurjako’s claim that intentionalist models of self-deception face their own version of the selectivity problem, offering an account of how intentions are formed that can explain the selectivity of self-deception, even in the “common or garden” cases that Jurjako emphasizes.

En este estudio se analiza la evolución de la protección de los menores frente a los riesgos de la publicidad durante la última década. Recoge los cambios legislativos y las aportaciones de la autorregulación publicitaria. Se exponen las deficiencias y se proponen alternativas para lograr una protección más eficaz.

O lugar comum dos estudos sobre as Istorie Fiorentine sugere que nesta obra Maquiavel revelaria uma mudança radical em sua compreensão de povo em relação às obras anteriores. Enquanto em O Príncipe e em Discursos Maquiavel teria feito uma demarcação muito nítida em relação ao modo de agir de grandi e popolo, nas Istorie tanto grandes quanto povo seriam mostrados como agentes de dominação. Nosso propósito será o de avaliar até que ponto é sustentável a interpretação corrente segundo a qual (...) em Histórias florentinas Maquiavel teria mostrado que: (a) o modo de agir do povo seria inconciliável com um comportamento de submissão à autoridade da lei; (b) a atuação do povo exibiria o mesmo desejo de comandar e oprimir que, em O Príncipe e Discursos, era apresentado como humor típico dos grandes; (c) estas transformações na atuação popular teriam comprometido o papel de “guardião da liberdade”, em Discursos atribuído por Maquiavel ao povo. (shrink)

After describing Wittgenstein's notion of ‘certainty’, in this article I provide four arguments to demonstrate that no certainty can be acquired at will. Specifically, I argue that, in order to assimilate a certainty, it is irrelevant whether the individual concerned has found a ground that seemingly justifies that certainty; has a given mental state; is willing to accept the certainty on the proposal of a persuader; or tries to act according to the certainty involved. Lastly, I analyse how each of (...) these arguments is reflected in the way children acquire certainties. (shrink)

This commentary on Jacob and Jeannerod’s Ways of Seeing evaluates the conclusions that the authors draw from the two visual systems hypothesis about the nature and phenomenology of visual experience.

The existence of structures with non-trivial authomorphisms (such as the automorphism of the field of complex numbers onto itself that swaps the two roots of – 1) has been held by Burgess and others to pose a serious difficulty for mathematical structuralism. This paper proposes a model-theoretic solution to the problem. It suggests that mathematical structuralists identify the “position” of an n-tuple in a mathematical structure with the type of that n-tuple in the expansion of the structure that has a (...) name for every element in it. (shrink)

I argue that our procedures for determining whether ascriptions of a predicate represent things as being a certain way are ultimately pragmatic. Pragmatic procedures are not subject to validation by the referential procedure – determining whether there is a property playing the role of its referent. Predicates can represent even if we can't provide an independent identification of its referent. For these predicates, the speakers’ knowledge of how they represent objects as being would have to be construed in terms of (...) the ascription practices they associate with the predicates. The same approach can be applied to semantic predicates, such as ‘is representational’ or ‘refers to’. They can be treated as representational even if we can't provide an independent identification of their referents. The availability of this position undermines accounts of the referents of semantic predicates in naturalistic terms. (shrink)

Set theory deals with the most fundamental existence questions in mathematics—questions which affect other areas of mathematics, from the real numbers to structures of all kinds, but which are posed as dealing with the existence of sets. Especially noteworthy are principles establishing the existence of some infinite sets, the so-called “arbitrary sets.” This paper is devoted to an analysis of the motivating goal of studying arbitrary sets, usually referred to under the labels of quasi-combinatorialism or combinatorial maximality. After explaining what (...) is meant by definability and by “arbitrariness,” a first historical part discusses the strong motives why set theory was conceived as a theory of arbitrary sets, emphasizing connections with analysis and particularly with the continuum of real numbers. Judged from this perspective, the axiom of choice stands out as a most central and natural set-theoretic principle (in the sense of quasi-combinatorialism). A second part starts by considering the potential mismatch between the formal systems of mathematics and their motivating conceptions, and proceeds to offer an elementary discussion of how far the Zermelo—Fraenkel system goes in laying out principles that capture the idea of “arbitrary sets”. We argue that the theory is rather poor in this respect. (shrink)

A través de una mirada histórica este artículo muestra cómo filosofía y literatura han mantenido una línea de relación compleja pero inevitable, mostrando esa zona en que los seres humanos, como individuos y seres sociales, han de dar respuestas a situaciones singulares desde la experiencia adquirida y la atención a la multiplicidad. Se hace hincapié en las principales etapas, se mencionan algunos autores relevantes y se ofrece al lector una reflexión que presenta ambas formas como necesarias para la construcción del (...) orden y buscar salidas a la encrucijada de la vida pues esta, conocimiento y sentido moral, solo es viable desde esa doble atención. (shrink)

The role played by real-valued functions in functional analysis is fundamental. One often considers metrics, or seminorms, or linear functionals, to mention some important examples. We introduce the notion of definable real-valued function in functional analysis: a real-valued function f defined on a structure of functional analysis is definable if it can be "approximated" by formulas which do not involve f. We characterize definability of real-valued functions in terms of a purely topological condition which does not involve logic.

Este trabalho analisa reflexões sobre a abordagem pedagógica denominada “Metodologias Ativas”, que estão sendo apresentadas como alternativa para melhorar os resultados de ensino e aprendizagem no Brasil. Por meio de uma revisão bibliográfica, são apresentados alguns dos principais elementos das Metodologias Ativas, principalmente suas características mais evidentes. Busca, também, trazer à discussão alguns questionamentos sobre essa abordagem pedagógica, indicando a existência de possíveis dificuldades que possam comprometer a aplicação das Metodologias Ativas. A partir deste estudo, registra-se que são necessários novos (...) estudos sobre as potencialidades e dificuldades de implantação de Metodologias Ativas, analisando resultados efetivos de aprendizagem ativa. Palavras-chave: Metodologias Ativas. Aprendizagem ativa. Tecnologias digitais. Educação. (shrink)

Investigar a natureza do trabalho de ensinar dos sofistas na Grécia é o objetivo deste artigo. É amplamente reconhecido o preconceito histórico-ideológico que a própria palavra sofista carrega ao longo da história da educação. Afirmamos, preliminarmente, que não vamos arrancar essa marca intrincada que, em certo sentido, assinalou o caráter dos primeiros trabalhadores do ensino na civilização ocidental. No horizonte histórico-filosófico, quando a visão cosmológica é substituída pela antropológica, são os sofistas responsáveis pelo nascimento de nova profissão: a do trabalho (...) de ensinar. De domínio ideológico, político, econômico e vinculado ao âmbito teórico-metodológico, o problema pode ser traduzido na seguinte pergunta: Em que medida pode-se afirmar que o Movimento Sofístico, de fato, era um movimento desprezível e, portanto, aproveitara da sua obra, a educação, em favor da esfera econômica? Indagar os sofistas é perguntar qual é o sentido e os princípios da atividade do ensino em sua abrangência e complexidade histórico-teórica. Sabemos perfeitamente bem que a finalidade prática do trabalho, nessa época, era negada em todos os aspectos. Portanto, queremos responder às causas sobre o sentido, de fato, do trabalho sofístico. De caráter bibliográfico, este artigo tem, as obras de Platão, Aristóteles, Xenofonte e Aristófanes, as secundárias, as de Werner Jaeger, Henri-Marrou, Mario Alighiero Manacorda, Giovanni Reale e Anibal Ponce. Foram consultadas também obras nacionais e internacionais. Palavras-chave: Sofistas. Trabalho. Educação. (shrink)

Essays on Spanish-American philosophy, particularly Mexican. Part 2 includes selections from the works of José Vasconcelos, Antonio Caso, Samuel Ramos, Adolfo Menéndez Samara, Oswaldo Robes, Alfonso Reyes, Justino Fernández, Edmundo O'Gorman, J.D. García Bacca, Eduardo Nicol, José Medina Echevarría and Juan Larrea.

Unlike some other reproductions of classic texts (1) We have not used OCR(Optical Character Recognition), as this leads to bad quality books with introduced typos. (2) In books where there are images such as portraits, maps, sketches etc We have endeavoured to keep the quality of these images, so they represent accurately the original artefact. Although occasionally there may be certain imperfections with these old texts, we feel they deserve to be made available for future generations to enjoy.

A todo o momento temos inúmeras experiências conscientes. Neste momento, por exemplo, tenho uma experiência visual do computador, uma experiência auditiva do latido do meu cachorro, uma experiência da pressão que exerço sobre a cadeira e uma experiência do fluxo de pensamentos que me ocorrem. Contudo, existem filósofos que afirmam que estas experiências conscientes permanecem todas unidas numa espécie de estado consciente abrangente, e outros filósofos que afirmam a existência de “micro-consciências” associadas com cada experiência consciente que não são necessariamente (...) interligadas e em sua maioria são autônomas. Isto é, alguns estudiosos defendem que a consciência é una, e outros defendem que ela é fragmentária. Neste artigo, apresentaremos as concepções unitária e fragmentária da consciência e discutiremos os problemas suscitados por cada uma. (shrink)

The phenomenon of prophecy is a significant topic with a relevant uniqueness in medieval Jewish thought. In Jewish tradition, prophecy was a form of intermediation between the divine and human. Our intention in this paper is to explore and understand this problem like a theological idea and like an intellectual phenomenon of consciousness with obvious epistemological implications. We shall do taking into account the philosophical influences of this conception, fundamentally Islamic thinkers, and focusing our search in the most significant perspectives (...) about the topic, namely Yehudah Ha-Levi, Abraham ibn Daud and Moses Maimonides. (shrink)